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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economies
with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be in-
terpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling
line. We prove the existence of an “active” Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that,
when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Wal-
ras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a
coutable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and
asymptotic price-takers. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72, D43, D50.
1 Introduction
Non-cooperative oligopoly, in a general equilibrium setting, is usually studied in economies
with a finite number of commodities. In this paper, we extend the analysis of non-cooperative
oligopoly to exchange economies with a countable infinity of commodities by using the strategic
market game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) (DS hereafter). As we make explicit in
Section 3, by using the Hotelling line, our setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly
with differentiated commodities. The strategic market game analysed by DS is a generalization
of the contributions of Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976), and Shapley and Shubik (1977). In this
class of games, when traders and commodities are finite, all traders turn out to have market
power on all commodities. Differently, the market power of a trader, who is active on an
infinite set of commodities, can converge to zero along the sequence of commodities or can
remain non-negligible. To describe these new phenomena, we introduce two notions. We say
that a trader is an “asymptotic oligopolist” if his market power is uniformly bounded away
from zero on an infinite subset of commodities. On the contrary, if trader’s market power
converges to zero along the sequence of commodity, we say that the trader is an “asymptotic
price-taker”. The former can be simply interpreted as the extension of the classical notion of
oligopolist to infinite economies (see Cournot (1838)). The latter describes a trader with a
mixed behaviour since she has a non-negligible market power on a finite set of commodities
while being an “approximate” price-taker1 on an infinite set of commodities. This kind of
∗We would like to thank Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Takashi Hayashi, Ludovic Julien, Herve´
Moulin, and Herakles Polemarchakis for their comments and suggestions.
†Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK.
‡Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK.
1Approximate means that trader’s market power is not zero but it can be arbitrary small by considering
different infinite sets of commodities.
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mixed behaviour arises endogenously, in equilibrium, in the strategic market game studied by
us and cannot arise in a setting with a finite number of commodities.
In an earlier literature on imperfect competition, it is possible to find similar examples of 
mixed behaviour. Negishi (1961) extended the theory of monopolistic competition of Cham- 
berlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) from partial to general equilibrium. To do so, he considered 
monopolistically competitive firms where each firm is characterized by a portfolio of commodi- 
ties containing all the commodities on which the firm has market power. He assumed that 
portfolios are strict subsets of all commodities so that a monopolistically competitive firm has 
market power on a subset of commodities while acting competitively on other commodities. 
In this way, he ruled out from his analysis both monopoly and oligopoly. In a similar vein, 
Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) introduced the notion of portfolio in the Cournot-Walras liter- 
ature on exchange economies initiated by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991). In their model, 
some traders are defined oligopolists and each of them is characterized by a portfolio that is 
a subset of the commodities owned by the oligopolist. In all these contributions, the portfolio of 
commodities is a primitive of the model and no formal explanation is given as to why a 
particular trader should behave strategically on some commodities and competitively on others. 
In contrast, in our paper, by using strategic market games, a traders’ market power is 
endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Our contributions are as follows. We first define an exchange economy with a countable in- 
finity of commodities and traders having a structure of multilateral oligopoly, i.e., an economy 
in which each trader owns commodity money and only one other commodity. Our approach 
relies on the literature on economies with infinitely many commodities and with a double infin- 
ity of commodities and traders initiated by Bewley (1972) and Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980) 
respectively. We then introduce the strategic market game and, as the previous contributions 
in this literature (see DS, Amir, Sahi, Shubik, and Yao (1990), and Sahi and Yao (1989), 
among others), we prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the convergence to 
the Walras equilibrium. The game analysed by DS is a strategic market game in which there is a 
trading post for each commodity where the commodity is exchanged for commodity money. The 
actions available to traders are bids, amounts of commodity money given in exchange for other 
commodities, and offers, amounts of commodities, owned by traders, put up in exchange for 
commodity money. Since in this game a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with no trade always exists, 
we prove the existence of an “active” Cournot-Nash equilibrium,2 at which all com- modities are 
exchanged. The proof adapts the approach used by Bloch and Ferrer (2001) for the case of two 
commodities to a setting with an infinite set of commodities. However, in a setting characterized 
by an infinite commodity space, additional restrictions on the marginal utilities of commodities 
in traders’ initial endowments are also required. After having defined the model and stated the 
main results, we first introduce the formal definitions of “asymp- totic oligopolist” and 
“asymptotic price-taker”. We then show some examples to illustrate the notion of asymptotic 
oligopolist and to provide, heuristically, under which conditions an asymptotic oligopolist 
exists. Perhaps surprisingly, we construct an example where, even if the number of traders 
active in each trading post is not uniformly bounded, there are traders “big enough”, in terms of 
initial endowment of commodity money, who are asymptotic oligopolists.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the mathematical model and
we state the existence and the convergence theorems. In Section 3, we introduce the definitions
of asymptotic oligopolist and asymptotic price-taker and we show some examples. In Section
4, we prove the two theorems. In Section 5, we draw some conclusions from our analysis. In the
appendixes, we list all the mathematical definitions and results, we establish the relationship
2DS proved the existence of an “equilibrium point” that is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which some
commodities are legitimately not exchanged. See Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998) and Busetto and Codognato
(2006) for a detailed analysis on “legitimately inactive” trading posts.
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between our model and the strategic market game analysed by DS, and we relate our market
power measure with the notions of marginal price and average price introduced by Okuno,
Postlewaite, and Roberts (1980).
2 The mathematical model
Let Tt be a finite set with cardinality k strictly greater than 1. Elements of Tt are traders
of type t. The set of traders is I = ∪∞t=1Tt. The set of commodities is J = {0, 1, 2, . . . }. The
commodity space is the space of bounded sequences `∞.3 The consumption set is a subset
of the commodity space and it is denoted by X. A commodity bundle x is a point in the
consumption set, where xj denotes the amount of commodity j. Let N be a subset of natural
numbers, XN>0 = {x ∈ X : xj ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J and xj > 0, for each j ∈ N}. A trader i is
characterized by an initial endowment, wi ∈ X, and a utility function, ui : X → R. Traders
of the same type have the same initial endowment and utility function. The context should
clarify whether the superscript refers to a trader type or to a trader. An exchange economy is
then a set E = {(ui, wi) : i ∈ I}.
An allocation x is a specification of a commodity bundle xi, for each i ∈ I, such that∑
i∈I x
i
j =
∑
i∈I w
i
j , for each j ∈ J . A price vector is denoted by p. Given a price vector p, we
define the budget set of trader i to be Bi(p) = {x ∈ X : ∑∞j=0 pjxij ≤∑∞j=0 pjwij}. A Walras
equilibrium is a pair (p,x) consisting of a price vector p and an allocation x such that xi is
maximal with respect to ui in i’s budget set, Bi(p), for each i ∈ I.
A commodity j is desired by a trader i if ui is an increasing function of the variable xij and
limxij→0
∂ui
∂xij
=∞, for any fixed choice of the other variables. The set of commodities desired
by a trader i is denoted by Li and the set of traders that desire commodity j is denoted by
Hj .
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Let σ be a positive constant. The initial endowment of a type t trader is
such that wt0 > 0, w
t
t > σ, and w
t
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Assumption 2. Let e be a positive constant such that σ < e. The aggregate initial endowment
of each commodity is such that
∑∞
t=1 w
t
0 < e and
∑∞
t=1 w
t
j < e, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Assumption 3. The utility function of a type t trader is continuous in the product topology,4
continuously Fre`chet differentiable in XLt>0, non decreasing, and concave, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Moreover, let λ and f be two positive constants such that λ < f , the marginal utilities of a
type t trader are such that λ ≤ ∂ut
∂xtt
(xt) ≤ ∂ut
∂xt0
(xt) ≤ f ,5 for each xt ∈ X, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Assumption 4. A commodity j is desired by at least one type of trader, for each j ∈ J \{0}.
The first two assumptions are related to the structure of initial endowments. The first
imposes the structure of multilateral oligopoly6 and the second ensures that the aggregate
initial endowment is uniformly bounded. The third assumption imposes common restrictions
on the preferences of the traders. We need the additional conditions on the marginal utilities
of the commodities owned by a trader because we deal with an infinite number of commodities.
The last assumption is standard in the literature of strategic market game but our definition
3All the mathematical definitions and results can be found in Appendix A.
4In the space of bounded sequences, `∞, continuity in the product topology is equivalent to the continuity
in the Mackey topology (See Brown and Lewis (1981)).
5This assumption is satisfied, for instance, by utility functions linear in the commodities 0 and t.
6Shubik (1973) refers to multilateral oligopolies with commodity money as “world of oligopolies”.
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of desired commodity is more restrictive than the one of DS because we impose additional
restrictions on the limits of marginal utilities.
We now introduce the strategic market game Γ associated with the exchange economy E .7
For each commodity j ∈ J \ {0}, there is a trading post where commodity j is exchanged for
commodity money 0. Moreover, we impose that each trader can bid only on the commodities
that he does not own, i.e. there is no wash sales.
The strategy set of a trader i of type t is
Si =
{
si = (qit, b
i
1, . . . , b
i
t−1, b
i
t+1, . . . ) : 0 ≤ qit ≤ wit, bij ≥ 0, for j ∈ J \ {0, t},
and
∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0
}
,
where qit is the quantity of commodity t that trader i offers to sale and b
i
j is the amount of
commodity money that he bids on commodity j. Without loss of generality, we make the
following technical assumption on the strategy set.
Assumption 5. The set Si is a subset of `∞ endowed with the product topology, for each
i ∈ I, i.e., Si ⊆ {si ∈ `∞ : sup |sij | ≤ e}.
By assuming that the space `∞ in endowed with the product topology, we impose on `∞
the norm ‖x‖∞ = supi ‖aixi‖ such that {ai} is a sequence of real number converging to zero.
(see Brown and Lewis (1981)). This assumption ensures that Si lies in a normed space and
then in a Hausdorff space.
Let S =
∏
i∈I S
i and S−z =
∏
i∈I\{z} S
i. Let s and s−i be elements of S and S−i
respectively. For each s ∈ S, the price vector p(s) is such that
pj(s) =
{
bj
qj
if qj 6= 0
0 if qj = 0
, (1)
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with qj =
∑
i∈Tj q
i
j and bj =
∑
i∈I\Tj b
i
j . By Assumption 2, the sums qj
and bj are finite. For each s ∈ S, the commodity bundle xi(s) of a trader i of type t is such
that
xi0(s) = w
i
0 −
∑
j 6=0,t
bij + q
i
tpt(s),
xit(s) = w
i
t − qit,
xij(s) =
{
bij
pj(s)
if pj(s) 6= 0
0 if pj(s) = 0
, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
The payoff function of a trader i is pii(s) = ui(xi(s)).
We now introduce the definitions of an active trading post, a best response correspondence,
and a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. A trading post for a commodity j is said to be active if qj > 0 and bj > 0,
otherwise we say that the trading post is inactive.
Definition 2. The best response correspondence of a trader i is a correspondence φi : S−i →
Si such that
φi(s−i) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
pii(si, s−i),
for each s−i ∈ S−i.
7This game was introduced by Shubik (1973). In Appendix B, we prove that in multilateral oligopolies the
game Γ is equivalent to the game analysed by DS in terms of attainable commodity bundles.
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Definition 3. An sˆ ∈ S is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ if sˆi ∈ φi(sˆ−i), for each i ∈ I.
An active Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium such that all trading
posts are active. A type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
such that all traders of the same type play the same strategy. An interior Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium such that
∑
j 6=0,t b
i
j < w
i
0, for each i ∈ I.
We now state the existence theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ
exists.
In the next theorem, we show that if traders are replicated infinitely many times, then
the price vector and the allocation, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, converge to the Walras
equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy.8 Before to state the theorem, we introduce
the following additional notation. Let kΓ be a game Γ with k replicas of each type of traders
and ksˆ be a type symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of kΓ. To each ksˆ can be associated a
vector ks˜ that associate a strategy to each type of trader, i.e., ks˜ ∈
∏∞
t=1 S
t and ks˜
t = ksˆ
t, for
t = 1, 2, . . . . We denote by p(ks˜) and hx(ks˜) a price vector and an allocation of an exchange
economy with h replicas of each type of trader such that p(ks˜) = p(ksˆ) and hx
t(ks˜) = x
t(ksˆ),
for t = 1, 2, . . . , for all h replicas.
Theorem 2. Consider a sequence of games {kΓ}∞k=2. Suppose there exists a sequence of inte-
rior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibria, {ksˆ}∞k=2, such that the sequences {ks˜}∞k=2
and {p(ks˜)}∞k=2 converge to v˜ and to p(v˜), respectively. Then, the pair (p(v˜), kx(v˜)) is a Walras
equilibrium of the exchange economy associated to the game kΓ, for any k.
3 Asymptotic oligopolists: patterns of strategic behaviour
In this section, we first introduce a market power measure for the game Γ and we define
the notions of an asymptotic oligopolist and an asymptotic price-taker. We then focus on the
notion of asymptotic oligopolist and we illustrate it with examples.
In the game Γ, the market power of a trader i of type t on commodity j, with j 6= t, can
be measured by the following ratio bij/bj . The higher this ratio is, the higher is the market
power of trader i on commodity j. If bij = 0, we say that trader i is a trivial price taker on
commodity j. The market power of a trader i of type t on commodity t can be measured in
the analogous way by the index qit/qt.
Definition 4. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ in which there exists a trader i
such that bˆij > 0 for an infinite number of commodities. We say that trader i is an asymptotic
price-taker if limj→∞ bˆij/bˆj = 0, otherwise we say that trader i is an asymptotic oligopolist.
The key features of an asymptotic oligopolist are that he consumes an infinite number of
commodities and his market power is uniformly bounded away from zero on an infinite set of
commodities.
We now show some examples to illustrate the notion of asymptotic oligopolist and to
provide, heuristically, under which conditions an asymptotic oligopolist exists. To simplify
computations, in all examples we consider logarithmic additive utility functions of the form
xi0 +x
i
t+
∑
j βj lnx
i
j .
9 All the utility functions in the examples below are linear in commodity
8Our setting can be considered as a particular case of the exchange economy considered by Wilson (1981)
for which a Walras equilibrium exists.
9Logarithmic utility functions facilitate computations but are not continuous at the boundary. Therefore
they violate Assumption 3. This does not affect the current analysis but should be kept in mind.
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money (the numeraire good) as well as the commodity owned by the trader. Moreover, to
each commodity is associated a utility coefficient, βj , that converts the utility associated
with consumption of that commodity into the numeraire good. The use of logarithmic utility
functions implies that traders can consume a large or an infinite number of commodities. This
means that commodities are imperfect substitutes and traders display preference for variety.
Furthermore, we assume that each commodity corresponds to a point on a Hotelling line, so
that the degree of substitutability between commodities is measured by their distance. In
particular, we consider an Hotelling line of length one on which commodities are placed in
the following way: commodity 1 is at the origin of the line, commodity 2 is in the middle
of the line, commodity 3 is in the middle of the second half, and so on. Figure 1 illustrates
the arrangement of commodities along the line. As the diagram makes clear, commodities are
A
1
B
2 3 4 5 ...
Figure 1
clustered in the vicinity of point B. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of each example below,
all traders, who consume positive amount of an infinite number of commodities, concentrate
the higher bids on the commodities at the beginning of the Hotelling line and spread the
small bids on the commodities clustered around point B. The economic interpretation of this
behaviour is that, heuristically, traders prefer to spread small bids on a large variety of similar
commodities and then bids are higher only for the commodities with no close substitutes.10
In the first example, we show an exchange economy in which at the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium some traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Example 1. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and t ≥ 4 have
the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 + δ
3 lnx23 w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 + δ
4 lnx34 w
3 =
(
δ2
1− δ , 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t + δ
t+1 lnxtt+1 w
t =
(
δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
with δ ∈ (0, 1). The type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ associated
to the exchange economy is(
qˆ11 , bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ1G(1)2, δ2G(1), δ3G(2), . . . , δjG(2), . . .
)
,(
qˆ22 , bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ2G(1)2, δ1G(1), δ3G(2), 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,(
qˆ33 , bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, bˆ
3
5, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2δ3G(1)G(2), 0, 0, δ4G(2), 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,(
qˆtt , bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, bˆ
t
t+2, . . .
)
=
(
2δtG(1)G(2), 0, . . . , 0, δt+1G(2), 0, . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with G(y) =
(
1− 1yk
)
. At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium, type 1 traders are
asymptotic oligopolists.
10This interpretation also provides a possible economic meaning to continuity in the product topology in a
setting with differentiated commodities.
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Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power measure of type 1 traders, bˆ1j/bˆj ,
is equal to 12k , for each j ≥ 3. Hence limj→∞ bˆ1j/bˆj = 12k .
In this example, type 1 traders are the asymptotic oligopolists because all traders make the
same bid on each commodity j and in each trading post “only” 2k traders are active.
In the next example, we show that if this latter feature is not true, no trader is an asymp-
totic oligopolist.
Example 2. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1 are the same of
Example 1 and traders of types 2, 3, and t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial
endowments
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 +
∞∑
j=3
δj lnx2j w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 +
∞∑
j=4
δj lnx3j w
3 =
(
δ2
1− δ , 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t +
∞∑
j=t+1
δj lnxtj w
t =
(
δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
with δ ∈ (0, 1). The type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ associated
to the exchange economy is(
qˆ11 , bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ1G(1)2, δ2G(1), δ3G(2), . . . , δjG(j − 1), . . . ),(
qˆ22 , bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ2G(1)2, δ1G(1), δ3G(2), . . . , δjG(j − 1), . . . ),(
qˆ33 , bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2δ3G(1)G(2), 0, 0, δ4G(3), . . . , δjG(j − 1), . . . ),(
qˆtt , bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . .
)
=
(
(t− 1)δtG(1)G(t− 1), 0, . . . , 0, δt+1G(t), . . . ),
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with G(y) =
(
1 − 1yk
)
. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, no trader is an
asymptotic oligopolist.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power measure of a type t trader, bˆtj/bˆj ,
is equal to 1(j−1)k , for each j ≥ 3, for t = 1, 2, . . . . Hence, limj→∞ bˆtj/bˆj = 0, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
The crucial difference with Example 1 is that the number of traders active in each trading
post is not uniformly bounded and this counteracts the market power of type 1 traders. Since
the number of active traders in each trading post is striclty increasing and all traders make
the same bid on each commodity, traders’ bids become negligible in comparison to the bids of
all others along the sequence of commodities. Hence, all traders are asymptotic price-takers.
A different result is obtained if there is a type of trader that places higher bids than other
traders along the sequence of commodities. In the next example, we show that, even if the
number of traders that desire each commodity in not uniformly bounded, there are asymptotic
oligopolists.
Example 3. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of types 2, 3, and t ≥ 4 are
the same of Example 2 and traders of type 1 have the following utility function and initial
endowment
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
1
j2
lnx1j , w
1 =
(
pi2
6
, 1, 0, . . .
)
.
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For k = 2 and δ = 1/3, the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ
associated to the exchange economy is(
qˆ11 , bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
1
12
,
1
8
,
√
13− 1
36
, . . . ,
(2j + 1)j2 − 3j − F (j)
4j2 (j2 − 3j) , . . .
)
,
(
qˆ22 , bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
1
16
,
1
6
,
7−√13
108
, . . . ,
(5− 2j)j2 + 3j(4j − 7)− F (j)
3j4(j − 2)(3j − j2) , . . .
)
,
(
qˆ33 , bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2 +
√
13
108
, 0, 0,
227−√4729
14040
, . . . , bˆ2j , . . .
)
,
(
qˆtt , bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, bˆ
t
t+2, . . .
)
=
(
(2j − 5)j2 + 3j + F (j)
3j8j2
, 0, . . . , 0, bˆ2j , 0, . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with F (y) =
√
(5− 2y)2y4 + 3y2y2(6y − 11) + 9y. At this Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power measure of type 1 traders, bˆ1j/bˆj ,
is equal to (2j−5)j
2+3j+1−F (j)
4(3j−j2) , for each j ≥ 3. Hence, limj→∞ bˆ1j/bˆj = 12 .
In this example, type 1 traders are again asymptotic oligopolists because they placed suffi-
ciently higher bids than other traders in each trading post. Therefore, along the sequence
of commodities, the bids made by type 1 traders do not become negligible in comparison to
the bids of all others. Heuristically, a trader, with a sufficiently higher initial endowment of
commodity money and a sequence of utility coefficients that converges to zero slower than the
ones of other traders, can be an asymptotic oligopolist even if the number of traders active
in each trading post is not uniformly bounded. In Example 3, indeed, type 1 traders have an
higher initial endowment of commodity money than in the previous examples and the sequence
{ 1j2 } converges to zero slower that the sequence {δj}.
In the last example, we show why the notion of asymptotic oligopolist is defined by using
the notion of limit instead of the notion of limit point.
Example 4. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, s odd, and t even
have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 + δ
3 lnx23 w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
us(xs) = xs0 + x
s
s +
1
(s+ 1)2
lnxss+1 w
s =
(
1
(s− 1)2 , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t + δ
t+1 lnxtt+1 w
t =
( δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
.
For k = 2 and δ = 1/3, the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ
associated to the exchange economy is
(bˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3 . . . , bˆ
1
j , bˆ
1
j+1, . . . ) =
(
1
12
,
1
18
,
1
36
, . . . ,
6
3j5− j2 + F (j) ,
3
3j+14
, . . .
)
,
(qˆ22 , bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
1
36
,
1
6
,
1
36
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(qˆss , bˆ
s
1, . . . , bˆ
s
s−1, bˆ
s
s+1, bˆ
s
s+2, . . . ) =
(
3
3s4
, 0, . . . , 0,
6
5(s+ 1)2 − 3s+1 + F (s+ 1) , 0, . . .
)
,
(qˆtt , bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, bˆ
t
t+2, . . . ) =
(
t2 + 3t + F (t)
3t8t2
, 0, . . . , 0,
3
3t+14
, 0, . . .
)
,
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for s odd and t even, with F (y) =
√
y4 + 3y14y2 + 9y. At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power measure of trader 1, bˆ1j/bˆj , is
equal to 14 , for each j ≥ 3 and odd, and to 2j
2
3j2+F (j)+3j , for each j ≥ 3 and even. Hence, the
sequence of market power measures has two limit points 14 and 0.
In this example, even if the sequence of market power measures has two different limit points
and one of them is zero, type 1 traders can be considered asymptotic oligopolists because
there is an infinite number of commodities on which they have a non-negligible market power.
Moreover, the example shows that the notion of asymptotic oligopolist is very sensitive to the
pattern of bids. In fact, if type 1 traders made bids only on even commodities, they would be
asymptotic price-takers.
4 Proofs
Following DS, in order to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we in-
troduce the perturbed strategic market game Γ, the function xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ), and the set
Y i(s−i, ).11The perturbed strategic market game Γ is a game defined as Γ with the only
exception that the price vector p(s) becomes
pj(s) =
{
bj+
qj+
if qj 6= 0
0 if qj = 0
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with  > 0. The interpretation is that some outside agency places a
fixed bid of  and a fixed offer of  in each trading post. This does not change the strategy
sets of the various traders, but does affect the prices, the commodity bundles, and the payoffs.
Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and fix the strategies s−i for all other
traders. Let
xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) = w
i
0 +
(bt + )(w
i
t − xit)
qit + + w
i
t − xit
−
∑
j 6=0,t
(b
i
j + )x
i
j
qj + − xij
and let
Y i(s−i, ) =
{
(xi1, x
i
2, . . . ) ∈ X : xit = wit − qit, xij = bij
qj + 
b
i
j + b
i
j + 
, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t},
for each si ∈ Si
}
.
The function xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) can be easily obtained by the function x
i
0(s
i) by relabelling the
variables. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that this function is strictly concave since
it is a sum of concave and strictly concave functions. In the next Proposition, by following the
proof in Appendix A of DS, we prove that Y i(s−i, ) is a convex set.
Proposition 1. The set Y i(s−i, ) is convex.
Proof. Consider a trader i of type t and fix the strategies s−i for all other traders. Take
two commodity bundles x′i, x′′i ∈ Y i(s−i, ) and consider x˜i = λx′i + (1− λ)x′′i. We want to
show that x˜i ∈ Y i(s−i, ). Hence, there must exist a strategy s˜i ∈ Si such that xi(s˜i) = x˜i.
Let x′i = xi(s′i) and x′′i = xi(s′′i). Consider first the commodity t. It is straightforward to
11DS denotes the set Y i(s−i, ) with Di(Q,B, ).
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verify that x˜it = x
i
t(λq
′i
t + (1− λ)q′′it ). Consider now a commodity j 6= t. The function xij(s˜i)
is concave in bij , hence
x˜ij = λx
′i + (1− λ)x′′i = λxi(b′ij ) + (1− λ)xi(b′′ij ) ≤ xi(λb′ij + (1− λ)b′′ij ) ≤ x∗ij
By the intermediate value theorem and since x∗ij = 0 by setting b
′i
j = 0 and b
′′i
j = 0, we may
reduce b′ij and b
′′i
j appropriately to get x˜
i
j , for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
In the next lemma, we prove the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the
perturbed game.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, for each  > 0, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the strategic market game Γ exists.
Proof. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i and fix the strategies s−i for all other
traders. Let hi be a function such that hi(si) = (xi0(s
i, s−i), xi1(s
i, s−i), . . . ). Since the game
is perturbed, the payoff function pii is continuous in the product topology. By Tychonoff
Theorem (see Theorem 2.61, p. 52 in Aliprantis and Border), Si is compact. By Weierstrass
Theorem (see Corollary 2.35, p. 40 in Aliprantis and Border), there exists a strategy sˆi that
maximizes the payoff function. Hence, we can consider the best response correspondence
φi : S−i → Si. Since Si is a non-empty and compact Hausdorff space, by Berge Maximum
Theorem (see Theorem 17.31, p. 570 in Aliprantis and Border), φi is an upper hemicontinuous
correspondence.
We show now that φi is a continuous function. Suppose that there are two feasible com-
modity bundles xi and x′i that maximize the utility function. Consider the commodity bundle
x′′ii =
1
2x
i + 12x
′i. Since the utility function is concave, ui(x′′i) ≥ 12ui(xi) + 12ui(x′i) = ui(xi).
Since xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) is strictly concave and Y
i(s−i, ) is convex, there exists a γ > 0 such that
x′′i + γe0 is a feasible allocation12. But then, since the utility function is strictly increasing
in xi0, u
i(x′′i + γe0) > ui(xi), a contradiction. Therefore, there must be only one commod-
ity bundle that maximizes the utility function and then φi is a single valued correspondence.
Hence, φi is a continuous function (see Lemma 17.6, p.559 in Aliprantis and Border).
As we are looking for a fixed point in strategy space S, let’s consider φi : S → Si. Let
Φ : S → S such that Φ(S) = ∏i∈I φi(S). The function Φ is continuous since is a product
of continuous function (see Theorem 17.28, p. 568 in Aliprantis and Border). By Tychonoff
Theorem, S is compact. Moreover, S is a non-empty and convex Hausdorff space. Therefore, by
Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem (see Corollary 17.56, p. 583 in Aliprantis and Border),
there exists a fixed point sˆ of Φ, which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game
Γ.
In the next lemma, we prove that, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game,
a trader makes positive bids on all commodities that he desires.
Lemma 2. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game Γ, bˆij > 0, for each
j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. First, suppose that
there exists a trader i of type t such that bˆil = 0, for an l ∈ Li, and
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j < w
i
0. Consider
a strategy s′i such that b′il = bˆ
i
l +γ, with γ sufficiently small, and all other actions equal to the
actions of the original strategy sˆi. Since limxil→0
∂ui
∂xil
=∞, ui(xi(s′i, sˆ−i)) > ui(xi(sˆi, sˆ−i)), a
contradiction. Now, suppose that there exists a trader i of type t such that bˆil = 0, for an l ∈ Li,
and
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j = w
i
0. Then there is a commodity m such that bˆ
i
m > 0. Consider a strategy s
′i
such that b′im = bˆ
i
m−γ, b′il = bˆil +γ, with γ sufficiently small, and all other actions equal to the
12ej is an infinite vector in `∞ whose jth component is 1, and all others are 0.
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actions of the original strategy sˆi. Since limxil→0
∂ui
∂xil
=∞, ui(xi(s′i, sˆ−i)) > ui(xi(sˆi, sˆ−i)), a
contradiction. Hence, bˆij > 0, for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
In the next lemma, we prove that, at a Cournot-Nash equilibria of the perturbed game, qj
is positive for all commodities.
Lemma 3. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game Γ, qj > 0, for each
j ∈ J \ {0}.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Consider, without loss
of generality, a trader i of type t. Then, sˆi solves the following maximization problem
max
si
pii(si, sˆ−i),
subject to qit ≤ wit, (i)∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0, (ii)
− qit ≤ 0, (iii)
− bij ≤ 0 for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. (iv)
(2)
We now show that all the hypothesis of the Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (see Appendix
A) are satisfied. The constraints can be written as a function G : `∞ → Z, with Z ⊂ `∞.
Then, Z contains a positive cone P with a non-empty interior and G is Fre´chet differentiable.
Consider a point s ∈ S. By the definition of regular point (see Appendix A), we must show
that there exists an h ∈ `∞ such that G(s) + g′(s) h < 0. In matrix form, it becomes
qit − wit∑
j b
i
j − wi0
−qit
−bi1
−bi2
. . .

+

ht∑
j 6=t hj
−ht
−h2
−h3
. . .

<

0
0
0
0
0
. . .

.
First, suppose that the constraints (i) and (ii) are not binding. Consider a vector h with
hj = 0, for all j such that bj > 0, and hj positive and sufficiently small, for all other j. Hence,
s is a regular point. Now, suppose that the constraints (i) and (ii) are binding. Consider a
vector h with hj positive and sufficiently small, for all j such that bj = 0, and hj negative and
sufficiently small, for all other j. Hence, s is a regular point. The case in which only constraint
(i) or (ii) is binding can be solved analogously. Hence, all the points in the constrained set
are regular. By Lemma 2, the strategy sˆi is such that bˆij > 0, for each j ∈ Li, and then
the commodity bundles xi(sˆi) is contained in XLi>0. Since the utility function is continuously
Fre´chet differentiable in XLi>0 and we are considering a perturbed game, the payoff function pi
i
is continuously Fre´chet differentiable in a neighbourhood of sˆi. Hence, all the hypothesis of the
Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied and then there exist non-negative multipliers
λˆi∗1 and µˆ
i∗
t such that
∂pii
∂qit
(sˆi, sˆ−1)− λˆi∗1 + µˆi∗t = 0, (3)
λˆi∗1 (qˆ
i
t − wit) = 0,
µˆt
i∗qˆit = 0.
Since the payoff function is defined as pii(s) = ui(xi(s)), equation (3) becomes
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
bˆt + 
qˆ
i
t + qˆ
i
t + 
(
1− qˆ
i
t
qˆ
i
t + qˆ
i
t + 
)
− ∂u
i
∂xit
(xi(sˆ))− λˆi∗1 + µˆi∗t = 0. (4)
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Suppose that qt = 0. Then, qˆ
i
t = 0, for all traders of type t, and λˆ
i∗
1 = 0. Then, the equation
above becomes
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
bˆt + 

− ∂u
i
∂xit
(xi(sˆ)) + µˆi∗t = 0.
Since bˆt+ > 1 and
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi) ≥ ∂ui
∂xit
(xi), for each xi ∈ X, by Assumption 3, the left hand side
of the equation is greater than zero, a contradiction. Hence, qj > 0, for all j ∈ J \ {0}.
In the next lemma, we prove that all prices lie between two positive constants independent
from . Since the number of commodities is infinite, we could not apply the analogous lemma
of DS.
Lemma 4. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game Γ, there exist two positive
constants, independent from , Cj and Dj such that
Cj < p

j(sˆ) < Dj ,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Moreover, Cj is uniformly bounded away from zero and Dj is uniformly
bounded from above.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Without loss of gen-
erality, let j = l. We establish first the existence of Cl. By Lemma 3, there exists a trader
i of type l such that qˆil > 0. Then, a decrease γ in i’s offer of commodity l is feasible, with
0 < γ ≤ qˆil , and has the following incremental effects on the final holding of trader i.
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = (qˆil − γ)
bˆl + 
qˆl + − γ
− qˆil
bˆl + 
qˆl + 
,
=
bˆl + 
qˆl + 
(
(qil − γ)
qˆl + 
qˆl + − γ
− qˆil
)
≥ −pl (sˆ)γ,
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for j ∈ J \ {0, l},
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) = γ.
The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that qˆl +  > qˆl + − γ. Then, we
obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ)− pl (sˆ)γe0 + γel.
By Lemma 2, xi(sˆ) ∈ XLi>0, and by using a linear approximation of the utility function
around the point xi(sˆ), we obtain
u(xi(sˆ(γ)))− u(xi(sˆ)) ≥ − ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))pl (sˆ)γ +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))γ +O(γ2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the inequality is negative and then
pl (sˆ) >
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
/
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) = Cl.
By Assumption 3, Cl ≥ λf . Then, Cj ≥ λf , for each j ∈ J \{0}. Now, we establish the existence
of Dl. Since there are at least two traders for each type, we consider a trader i of type l such
that qil ≤ qˆl2 . We need to consider two cases. First, suppose that qˆil < wil . Then, an increase
12
0 < γ < min{wil − qˆil , } in i’s offer of l is feasible and has the following incremental effects on
the final holding of trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = (qˆil + γ)
bˆl + 
qˆl + + γ
− qˆil
bˆl + 
qˆl + 
,
=
bˆl + 
qˆl + 
qˆ
i
l + 
qˆ
i
l + qˆ
i
l + + γ
γ ≥ 1
3
pl (sˆ)γ,
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for j ∈ J \ {0, l},
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) = −γ.
The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that qˆil ≤ qˆ
i
l +  and γ ≤ qˆ
i
l + .
Then, we obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ) + 1
3
pl (sˆ)γe
0 − γel.
By Lemma 2, xi(sˆ) ∈ XLi>0, and by using a linear approximation of the utility function
around the point xi(sˆ), we obtain
u(xi(sˆ(γ)))− u(xi(sˆ)) ≥ ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
1
3
pl (sˆ)γ −
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))γ +O(γ2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the inequality is negative and then
pl (sˆ) < 3
(
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
/
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
)
= D1l .
By Assumption 3, D1l ≤ 3 fλ . Now, suppose that qˆil = wil . Then,
pl (sˆ) <
ke
wil
= D2l .
By Assumption 1, D2l ≤ keσ . Finally, we choose Dl such that Dl = max{D1l , D2l }. Since D1j
and D2j are uniformly bounded from above, Dj is uniformly bounded from above, for each
j ∈ J \ {0}.
In the next lemma, we prove that, at an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium, there exists
a positive lower bound, independent from , for each bid made by a trader on a desired
commodity.
Lemma 5. At an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game Γ, there exists
a positive constant bij , independent of , such that
0 < bij ≤ bˆij ,
for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Consider, without loss
of generality, a trader i of type t. Then, sˆi solves the maximization problem in (2). As in the
proof of Lemma 3, all the hypothesis of the Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied
and then there exist non-negative multipliers λˆi∗2 and µˆ
i∗
j , for j ∈ J \ {0, t}, such that
∂pii
∂bij
(sˆi, sˆ−1)− λˆi∗2 + µˆi∗j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, (5)
λˆi∗2
(∑
j 6=0,t
bˆij − wi0
)
= 0,
µˆi∗j bˆ
i
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
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Consider, without loss of generality, a commodity l ∈ Li. Since the payoff function is defined
as pii(s) = ui(xi(s)), equation (5) becomes
− ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
qˆl + 
bˆ
i
l + b
i
l + 
(
1− b
i
l
bˆ
i
l + b
i
l + 
)
− λˆi∗2 + µˆi∗j = 0. (6)
From the equation above and by Lemmas 2 and 4, we derive the following inequality
− ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
1
Dl
(
bˆ
i
l + 
bˆ
i
l + b
i
l + 
)
− λˆi∗2 ≤ 0.
Suppose that bil → 0. Then, limbil→0
bˆ
i
l+
bˆ
i
l+b
i
l+
= 1 and limbil→0
∂ui
∂xil
= ∞, as l ∈ Li. But then,
since ∂u
i
∂xi0
and Dl are bounded from above, the left hand side of the inequality is positive, a
contradiction. Hence, there exists a positive lower bound, bij , independent of , at which the
inequality is satisfied, for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
We now prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider a sequence of {g}∞g=1 converging to 0. By Lemma 1, in each
perturbed game there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, we can consider the sequence
of Cournot-Nash equilibria {g sˆ}∞g=1 associated to the sequence of . As proved before, S is
compact and, by Lemma 4, p(g sˆ) ∈ ∏j 6=0[Cj , Dj ] with Cj uniformly bounded away from
zero and Dj uniformly bounded from above, for each j ∈ J \ {0}. By Tychonoff Theorem,∏
j 6=0[Cj , Dj ] is compact. Then, we can pick a subsequence of {g sˆ}∞g=1 that converge to v
such that v ∈ S and p(v) ∈ ∏j 6=0[Cj , Dj ]. Therefore, v is a point of continuity of the payoff
functions and then it is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, i.e., vˆ. It remains to prove that vˆ is
an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By Assumption 4 and Lemma 5, for each commodity
j ∈ J \ {0}, bj ∈ [bij , e], for any , for a trader i such that j ∈ Li. Suppose that one trading
post is inactive. Then, there exists a commodity l such that ql = 0. But then, pl(vˆ) /∈ [Cl, Dl],
a contradiction. Therefore, qj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, and then vˆ is an active Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.
In the next part of the section, we prove Theorem 2. Before to do so, we define the marginal
price vector13 and we prove the analogous of Lemma 4 of DS for our setting with infinitely
many commodities.
Definition 5. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of Γ. The marginal price vector
for a trader i of type t, pit(sˆ), is such that
pit(sˆ) = pt(sˆ)
(
1− qˆ
i
t
qˆt
)
and pij(sˆ) = pj(sˆ)
(
1 +
bˆij
bˆ
i
j
)
, for all j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
Lemma 6. At an interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium ksˆ of the game
kΓ, a trader i of type t maximizes his payoff at the fixed marginal price vector kp
i(ksˆ), for
each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let ksˆ be an interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game
kΓ. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and the following maximization
13This definition is equivalent to the one of Okuno et al. (1980) only if the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is such
that 0 < qˆit < w
i
t, bˆ
i
j > 0, for j ∈ J \ {0, t}, and
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j < w
i
0.
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problem
max
ksi
pii(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)),
subject to qit ≤ wit, (i)∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0, (ii)
− qit ≤ 0, (iii)
− bij ≤ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, (iv)
(7)
with pii(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)) a payoff function at which the price vector is fixed and equal to p
i(ksˆ). Let
xi(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)) denote the commodity bundle of trader i when he plays ks
i and the price vector
is fixed and equal to pi(ksˆ). As in the proof of Lemma 3, all the hypothesis of the Generalized
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied and then, if a ks
i solves the maximization problem, there
exist non-negative multipliers λi∗1 , λ
i∗
2 and µ
i∗
j , for j ∈ J \ {0}, such that
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)))p
i
t(ksˆ)−
∂ui
∂xit
(xi(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)))− λi∗1 + µi∗t = 0, (8)
λi∗1 (qˆ
i
t − wit) = 0,
µi∗t qˆ
i
t = 0,
− ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(ks
i, pi(ksˆ))) +
∂ui
∂xij
(xi(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)))
1
pij(ksˆ)
− λi∗2 + µi∗j = 0, (9)
λi∗2 (
∑
j 6=0,t
bˆij − wi0) = 0,
µi∗j bˆ
i
j = 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. By using the definition of marginal price vector, it is straighfoward
to verify that equations (4) and (6) become (8) and (9) respectively. But then, ksˆ
i, λˆi∗1 , λˆ
i∗
2 ,
and µˆi∗j , for j ∈ J \ {0}, satisfy all the first order conditions associated to the maximization
problem (7). Since the utility function is concave and prices are fixed, the payoff function
pii(ks
i, pi(ksˆ)) is concave. Hence ksˆ
i is optimal for the problem (7).14
We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let {kΓ}∞k=2 be a sequence of games kΓ. Assume that there exists
a sequence of interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibria {ksˆ}∞k=2 such that the
sequences {ks˜}∞k=2 and {p(ks˜)}∞k=2 converge to v˜ and to p(v˜) respectively. Consider, without
loss of generality, a trader i of type t. By Lemma 6, ksˆ
i solves the maximization problem (7),
for any k, and since ksˆ
i is an interior type symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the
constraints (ii) and (iii) are not binding. Let p0(ksˆ) = 1, for any k.
15 It is straightfoward
to verify that xi(ksˆ
i, pi(ksˆ)) belongs to the budget set at price p
i(ksˆ), B
i(pi(ksˆ)), for any
k. Now, suppose that there exists a commodity bundle x′i ∈ Bi(pi(ksˆ)) such that ui(x′i) >
ui(xi(ksˆ
i, pi(ksˆ))). Since the utility function is non decreasing, x
′i
j > x
i
j(ksˆ
i, pi(ksˆ)), for at
least one commodity j. But since
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j < w
i
0 and −qˆit < 0, there exists a feasible strategy
ks
′i ∈ Si such that xij(ks′i, pi(ksˆ)) = x′ij , a contradiction. Hence, the commodity bundle
xi(ksˆ
i, pi(ksˆ)) maximizes the utility function on B
i(pi(ksˆ)), for each trader i ∈ I, for any
k. Now, consider the sequence {pt(ks˜)}∞k=2, for a representative trader of type t. By the
assumptions of the Theorem and by the definition of marginal price vector, limk→∞ ptj(ks˜) =
14This conclusion can be also formally obtained by Theorem 2 of Section 8.5 and Lemma 1 of Section 8.7 in
Luenberger (1969).
15With a slight abuse of notation, p(k sˆ) denotes also a marginal price vector in which the first element is
p0(k sˆ).
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pj(v˜), for each j ∈ J \ {0}, for t = 1, 2, . . . . Since sˆ is a type symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, D2j in Lemma 4 becomes
e
σ . Then, Cj and Dj are independent from k, for each
j ∈ J \ {0}. But then, by Lemma 4, p(v˜) ∈∏j 6=0[Cj , Dj ]. Therefore, v˜ is a point of continuity
of the payoff function and then the commodity bundle xt(v˜) is optimal on Bi(p(v˜)), for t =
1, 2, . . . . Hence (p(v˜), kx(v˜)) is a Walras equilibrium for the exchange economy associated to
kΓ, for any k.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange
economies with infinitely many commodities. For a strategic market game with a countable
infinity of commodities, we have proved the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium
and the converge to the Walras equilibrium when traders are replicated. Moreover, we have
examined, via a number of examples, how the notion of oligopoly changes in our setting by
distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists, the traders whose market is uniformly bounded
away from zero on an infinite subset of commodities, and asymptotic price-takers, the ones
whose market power converges to zero over the set of commodities.
In the first example, we have shown that some traders are asymptotic oligopololists because,
heuristically, traders have similar preferences and only few of them are active in each trading
post. In the second example, we have shown a case in which the number of trader active in
each trading post is non uniformly bounded and for this reason all traders are asymptotic
price-takers. In the third example, we have shown that, even if the number of traders active
in each trading post is not uniformly bounded, some traders with an higher initial endowment
of commodity money and with particular preferences can be asymptotic oligopolists. All the
examples have shown that whether or not a trader is an asymptotic oligopolist in equilibrium
is sentitive to the initial endowment of commodity money and to the “size of the market” in
each trading post, which depends on preferences throughout traders.
In the last example, we have shown why we have used the notion of limit to define an
asymptotic oligopolist instead of the notion of limit point. Furthermore, by using the limit,
asymptotic price-takers are approximate price-taker on the tail of the sequence of commodities.
Hence, heuristically, they have market power locally but they are globally negligibile, i.e., they
have market power on a finite set of commodies but they are approximate price taker on an
infinite set of commodities at the tail of the sequence of commodities. In future research,
we intend to develop this approach to study some key features of monopolistic competition
in strategic market games. A similar idea was devoloped by Gretsky and Ostroy (1985) and
Ostroy and Zame (1994) by studying the core of economies with a continuum of commodities
and traders.
As already remarked, by using the Hotelling line, our setting can be interpreted as a model
of oligopoly with differentiated commodities and thus useful for the study of antitrust policy
issues. We intend to pursue this point in future research.
A Mathematical appendix
In this appendix, we describe the mathematical notions that we use in the paper. The
definitions and the theorems are based on Luenberger (1969). The page number in brackets
refers to Luenberger (1969).
Definition (`∞ spaces). The space `∞ consists of bounded sequences. The norm of an element
x = {ξi} in `∞ is defined as ‖x‖∞ = supi |xi| (p. 29).
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As already remarked, by assuming that the space `∞ in endowed with the product topology,
we impose on `∞ the norm ‖x‖∞ = supi ‖aixi‖ such that {ai} is a sequence of real number
converging to zero (see Brown and Lewis (1981)).
Definition (Transformation T ). Let X and Y be linear vector spaces and let D be a subset
of X. A rule which associates with every element x ∈ D an element y ∈ Y is said to be a
transformation from X to Y with domain D. If y correspond to x under T , we write y = T (x)
(p. 27).
Definition (Fre´chet differentiable). Let T be a transformation defined on an open domain D
in a normed space X and having range in a normed space Y . If for fixed x ∈ D and each
h ∈ X there exists δT (x;h) ∈ Y which is linear and continuous with respect to h such that
lim
‖h‖→0
‖T (x+ h)− T (x)− δT (x;h)‖
‖h‖ = 0
then T is said to be Fre´chet differentiable at x and δT (x;h) is said to be the Fre´chet differential
of T at x with incremental h (p. 172).
Definition (Continuously Fre´chet differentiable). The Fre´chet differential of T at x with
incremental h can be written as T ′(x)h. If the correspondence x→ T ′(x) is continuous at the
point x0, we say that the Fre´chet derivative of T is continuous at x0. If the derivative of T is
continuous on some open sphere S, we say that T is continuously Fre´chet differentiable on S
(p. 175).
Definition (Normed dual). Let X be a normed linear vector space. The space of all bounded
linear function on X is called the normed dual of X and is denoted by X∗ (p. 106).
Luenberger states the Regular Point definition (p. 248) and the Generalized Kuhn-Tucker
Theorem (p. 249-250) for vector spaces. Since we deal with normed spaces, we state them for
this particular spaces (Example 1, p. 250). Moreover, since it is not crucial for the proof, we
require only that f and G are Fre´chet differentiable in a neighbourhood of the maximum x0
and not on all the domain (e.g. Maurer and Zowe (1979)).
Definition (Regular Point). Let X be a normed vector space and let Z be a normed vector
space with a closed positive cone P having non-empty interior. Let G be a mapping G : X → Z
which is Fre´chet differentiable. A point x0 ∈ X is said to be a regular point of the inequality
G(x) ≤ 0 if G(x0) ≤ 0 and there is an h ∈ X such that G(x0) + g′(x0) · h < 0.
Theorem (Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem). Let X be a normed vector space and Z be
a normed vector space having a closed positive cone P . Assume that P contains an interior
point. Let f be a real-valued function on X and G a mapping from X into Z. Suppose x0
maximizes f subject to G(x) ≤ 0 and that x0 is regular point of the inequality G(x) ≤ 0.
Moreover suppose that f and G are Fre´chet differentiable in a neighbourhood of x0. Then
there is a z∗0 ∈ Z∗, z∗0 ≥ 0 such that
f ′(x0) + z∗0G
′(x0) = 0
z∗0 ·G(x0) = 0
B The strategic market game introduced by DS
In this appendix, we show the relationship between the game Γ and the strategic market
game analysed by DS. The main difference is that in their game traders are allowed to sell and
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buy the same commodity. We first introduce the original game analysed by DS. Let’s call this
game Γ. The strategy set of trader i is
Si =
{
si = (qi
1
, bi1, q
i
2
, bi2, . . . , q
i
j
, bij , . . . ) : 0 ≤ qij ≤ wij , b
i
j ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0},
and
∞∑
j=1
bij ≤ wi0
}
.
For each s ∈ S, the price vector p(s) is such that
pj(s) =
{
bj
qj
if qj 6= 0
0 if qj = 0
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with qj =
∑
i∈I q
i
j
and bj =
∑
i∈I b
i
j . For each s ∈ S, the commodity
bundle xi(s) of a trader i is such that
xi0(s) = w
i
0 −
∞∑
j=1
bij +
∞∑
j=1
qi
j
pj(s),
xij(s) =
{
wij − qij +
bij
pj(s)
if pj(s) 6= 0
0 if pj(s) = 0
, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
The payoff function of trader i is such that pii(s) = ui(xi(s)).
Proposition 2. Consider an exchange economy having a multilateral oligopoly structure. An
allocation x is attainable at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the game Γ if and only if the
same allocation x is attainable at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the game Γ.
Proof. Let E be an exchange economy having a multilateral oligopoly structure. Let sˆ
be Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ. Let s be a strategy profile such that, for a
trader i of type t, (qi
1
, bi1, q
i
2
, bi2, . . . , q
i
t
, bit, . . . ) = (0, bˆ
i
1, 0, bˆ
i
2, . . . , qˆ
i
t, 0, . . . ), for each i ∈ I. It is
straightforward to verify that x(sˆ) and x(s) are equal. Suppose that s is not a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. Then, there exists a trader i of type t that can increase his payoff by playing
a strategy s′i. The only action that can increase the payoff of the trader is to increase b′it ,
because all other feasible deviations are available also in the game Γ. Then, xit(s
′i, s−i) > xit(sˆ).
But, by decreasing qˆit, the commodity bundle x
i
t(s
′i, s−i) is attainable also in the original
game, a contradiction. Hence, s is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ. Let sˆ be Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of the game Γ. Let s be a strategy profile such that, for a trader i of type
t, (qtt , b
i
1, b
i
2, . . . , b
i
t−1, b
i
t+1, . . . ) = (qˆ
i
t
− bˆ
i
t
pt(sˆ)
, bˆ
i
1, bˆ
i
2, . . . , bˆ
i
t−1, bˆ
i
t+1, . . . ), for each i ∈ I. It is
straightforward to verify that x(sˆ) and x(s) are equal. Suppose that s is not a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. Then, there exists a trader i of type t that can increase his payoff by playing a
strategy s′i. But, any possible deviation in Γ is available in Γ, a contradiction. Hence, s is a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ.
C Marginal prices and average prices
Okuno et al. (1980) used a different way to measure the market power of traders. They
introduce the notions of marginal price and average price and they show that when the two
prices are equal traders have no market power. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ, the average
price vector is equal to p(sˆ) and the marginal price vector is defined in Definition 5. The
next proposition shows the relationship between our market power measure and the notions
of average price and marginal price.
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Proposition 3. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of Γ. For a trader i of type
t, the marginal price vector is equal to the average price vector if and only if qˆit
/
qˆt = 0 and
bˆij
/
bˆj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
Proof. Let sˆ be an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ. Consider a trader i of type t. First,
suppose that pi(sˆ) = p(sˆ). This implies that qˆit/qˆt = 0 and bˆ
i
j/bˆ
i
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
But then, also bˆij/bˆj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. Now, suppose that qˆit/qˆt = 0 and bˆij/bˆj = 0,
j ∈ J \ {0, t}. This implies that bˆij = 0 and then bˆij/bˆ
i
j = 0. Hence p
i(sˆ) = p(sˆ).
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